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 The Use of ASBOs against Young People in England and 
Wales: Lessons from Scotland 
 
Stuart Macdonald and Mark Telford 
 
Abstract:  
 
The ASBO is one of the best known measures used to tackle anti-social behaviour.  In 
keeping with the popular conception, the order is frequently used against young people.  
Of all ASBOs issued in England and Wales to the end of 2005, roughly 40% were 
imposed on under-18s.  This article begins with a brief outline of the three principles at 
the heart of the celebrated Scottish children’s hearings system.  With reference to these 
principles, and to the provisions which govern the use of the order against 12-15 year-
olds north of the border, the article then discusses five areas of concern about the use of 
ASBOs against young people in England and Wales: the readiness to resort to ASBOs; 
the forum for ASBO applications; the terms of ASBOs; publicising the details of ASBOs; 
and custodial net-widening.  The article ends by suggesting reforms to the ASBO 
regime in England and Wales insofar as it is used against young people. 
 
Word count (including footnotes, excluding abstract): 14,081 
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The Use of ASBOs against Young People in England and 
Wales: Lessons from Scotland 
 
Introduction 
 
Since its introduction in April 1999, the Anti-Social Behaviour Order has become 
possibly the best known of the range of measures used to tackle anti-social behaviour.  
The general awareness of the order and its entry into popular culture have led to its 
acronym, ASBO, being entered in the Oxford English Dictionary.  It is even possible 
nowadays to buy a range of ASBO merchandise!  The popular understanding is that the 
order is primarily aimed at out-of-control youths, who hang around in groups 
intimidating and harassing local residents.  This conception of the ASBO is borne out by 
the statistics – to the end of 2005, just over 40% of all ASBOs issued in England and 
Wales had been against 10-17 year-olds.1  In light of the fact that the ASBO was actually 
designed for use solely against adults, this article outlines a number of concerns about 
the use of the remedy against young people in England and Wales.  Through an 
examination of the key principles at the heart of the celebrated Scottish children’s 
hearings system, and a comparison of the ASBO regime in England and Wales with the 
one in Scotland, it will suggest ways in which these concerns could usefully be addressed. 
In both England and Wales and Scotland, an ASBO may be imposed on any 
individual who has acted in an anti-social manner, that is to say acted in a manner that 
caused or was likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress to one or more persons not of 
                                                 
1 In England and Wales, information on the age of the recipient is available for 9544 of the 9853 
ASBOs issued to the end of 2005.  Of these 9544, 3997 (41.88%) were imposed on 10-17 year-olds, 
and 5547 (58.12%) were imposed on those aged 18 and over (figures from Home Office website). 
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the same household as himself, provided that an order is considered necessary to protect 
relevant persons from further anti-social acts by him.2  In Scotland, applications for an 
order may be made by local authorities and registered social landlords, while in England 
and Wales chief officers of local police, the chief constable of the British Transport 
Police, Housing Action Trusts and (in England) county councils may also apply.3  
Applications in Scotland are made to the Sheriff Court (sitting in either its civil or 
criminal capacity),4 while in England and Wales they may be made to the magistrates’ 
court, county court and criminal court.5  In both jurisdictions, interim orders can also be 
made.6  The prohibitions imposed by an ASBO must be necessary to protect people from 
further anti-social acts by the defendant,7 and may cover any defined area within, or the 
                                                 
2 Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (hereafter ‘CDA’), s 1(1); Antisocial Behaviour etc. (Scotland) Act 
2004 (hereafter ‘ASB (Scotland) Act’), ss 4(2), 143(1).  For criticism of the definition of ‘anti-social 
behaviour,’ and suggestions for how it could usefully be reformed, see S Macdonald ‘A Suicidal 
Woman, Roaming Pigs and a Noisy Trampolinist: Refining the ASBO’s Definition of “Anti-Social 
Behaviour”’ (2006) 69 M.L.R. 183).  The term ‘relevant persons’ essentially means those people 
within the area covered by the agency applying for the ASBO (CDA, s 1(1B); ASB (Scotland) Act, s 
4(13)). 
3 ASB (Scotland) Act, s 18; CDA, s 1(1A). 
4 ASB (Scotland) Act, s 4(1); Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act, s 234AA. 
5 CDA ss 1(3), 1B & 1c. 
6 ASB (Scotland) Act, s 7; CDA, s1D. 
7 ASB (Scotland Act), ss 4(6), 4(7); CDA, s 1(6).  In England and Wales an ASBO may only be 
discharged during its first two years if both the applicant for the order and the subject of it 
consent; thereafter either the applicant or the subject may apply for it to be varied or discharged 
(CDA, ss 1(8), 1(9)).  In Scotland the applicant for the order and the subject of it may apply for it 
to be varied or revoked at any time (ASB (Scotland) Act, s 5). 
 3 
whole of, England and Wales/Scotland.8  Breach of an ASBO without reasonable excuse 
is a criminal offence.9 
Although ASBOs have been available against those aged 10 and over in England 
and Wales since their introduction,10 New Labour’s original intention was that they 
would not be used routinely against those aged 10 to 15.  During the Parliamentary 
debates on the Crime and Disorder Bill, Home Office spokesman Alun Michael stated 
that the use of ASBOs against groups of youngsters hanging around committing minor 
acts of criminal damage was ‘unlikely’ to be appropriate.11  This was reflected in the draft 
Home Office guidance produced at the time.12  However, in the months between Royal 
Assent and the ASBO coming into force, the Government performed a U-turn, 
apparently in response to strong representations made by a number of local authorities.13  
The draft guidance was revised, and the final version of the guidance published a few 
weeks before the ASBO came into force stated: 
                                                 
8 ASB (Scotland) Act, ss 4(6), 4(7); CDA, s 1(6). 
9 ASB (Scotland) Act, s 9(1); CDA, s 1(10). 
10 CDA, s 1(1). 
11 HC Deb vol 314 col 871 23 June 1998.  Opposition amendments to limit the availability of 
ASBOs to those aged 16 and over were nonetheless rejected, on the basis that this would have 
created a gap in the measures available to deal with so-called families from hell.  Such families – 
described as those in which the adult members not only commit anti-social behaviour themselves, 
but also use the younger members as ‘deliverers’ of some of this behaviour – were to be dealt with 
using ASBOs in the case of those aged 10 and over, and Child Safety Orders in the case of those 
aged under 10 (col 869). 
12 Home Office Draft Guidance Document: Anti-Social Behaviour Orders (London: Home Office, 
1998), paras 3.5, 3.10. 
13 E Burney 'Talking Tough, Acting Coy: What Happened to the Anti-Social Behaviour Order?' 
(2002) 41 Howard Journal of Criminal Justice 469, pp 473-474. 
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‘It is unlikely that there will be many cases where it would be appropriate to apply 
for an order against a 10-11 year-old … [but] Applications may routinely be made 
for the middle and older age groups of juveniles and young people (e.g. 12-17 
year-olds) as experience has shown that such individuals may commit serious 
acts of anti-social behaviour without adult encouragement or involvement’14 
 
In Scotland, by contrast, the ASBO has only recently been made available against 
12-15 year-olds.15  At the time of its introduction, the order was only available against 
those aged 16 and above.16  When asked to explain this apparent discrepancy between the 
approaches taken north and south of the border, Scottish Office Minister Henry McLeish 
explained, ‘[I]n Scotland, there are already measures to deal with that age group – we 
felt that, after 27 years of progress, it was vital to keep the children's hearings system 
intact.’17  This provoked calls for the youth justice system in England and Wales to adopt 
a similar approach to the one in Scotland.  Alun Michael responded: 
 
‘I have made it clear that we believe that there are strengths in the Scottish 
system and weaknesses in the system in England and Wales. That is why … we 
have wanted to change the system in England and Wales, not by replicating the 
Scottish system, but by learning from it and from what happens in other parts of 
the world’18 
                                                 
14 Home Office Anti-Social Behaviour Orders - Guidance (London: Home Office, 1999) para 2.1  
15 ASB (Scotland) Act, s 4(2)(a). 
16 CDA, s 19. 
17 HC Deb vol 314 col 878 23 June 1998. 
18 HC Deb vol 314 col 880 23 June 1998. 
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This article argues that the widespread use of the ASBO against young people in 
England and Wales reflects a failure to learn from, and is symptomatic of a lack of 
commitment to, the key values which are central to the Scottish children’s hearings 
system.  It begins with a brief description of the children’s hearings system, which 
outlines the system’s three key principles.  It then discusses the use of ASBOs against 
young people, concentrating on five main areas of concern: the readiness to resort to 
ASBOs; the forum for ASBO applications; the terms of ASBOs; publicising the details of 
ASBOs; and custodial net-widening.  It ends by outlining a suggested scheme for the 
reform of the ASBO regime in England and Wales insofar as it is used against young 
people. 
 
Introduction to the Children’s Hearings System 
 
The children’s hearings system was introduced in 1971, following the blueprint 
set out in the report of the Kilbrandon Committee.19  Its introduction flowed in part from 
dissatisfaction with the capacity of criminal court systems – including specially modified 
juvenile criminal court systems – to respond appropriately to the problematic behaviour 
of young people.20  The Committee proposed a system in which only the gravest of crimes 
(such as murder, attempted murder and rape) would be prosecuted in the criminal 
courts, with all other crimes being dealt with by an integrated child welfare system 
designed to identify the child’s needs and propose solutions.  This system would apply to 
                                                 
19 Kilbrandon Committee Report on Children and Young Persons, Scotland, Cmnd 2306  
(Edinburgh, H.M.S.O., 1964) . 
20 Ibid, para 71. 
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children who were referred because they had committed an offence as well as to those in 
need of formal care for some other reason. 
Referrals to the children’s hearings system are first considered by an independent 
official known as the Reporter.  The Reporter determines whether there is sufficient 
prima facie evidence that one of the grounds of referral is established (eg, an offence has 
been committed)21 and, if this is the case, whether compulsory measures of supervision 
may be required.22  If so, the Reporter will refer the case to a children’s hearing.  If the 
ground of referral is accepted by the child and their family,23 the children’s hearing will 
decide whether formal intervention – known as a supervision requirement – is required 
to address the child’s needs.24 
The system is governed by the Children (Scotland) Act 1995.  Section 16 of the Act 
enshrines three overarching principles: participation; liberalism; and welfarism. 
 
Participation 
 
A key feature of the children’s hearings system is that decisions regarding the 
appropriate response to a child’s offending are made in a non-court setting by non-
judicial personnel, following non-judicial processes.  Children’s hearings are lay bodies 
comprising volunteers from the child’s community.  Since the ground of referral has 
already either been agreed by the child and parents or established following due process 
of law in the sheriff court, hearings adopt a relatively informal, roundtable (usually 
                                                 
21 The grounds of referral are contained in Children (Scotland) Act 1995, s 52(2). 
22 Children (Scotland) Act 1995, s 56(6). 
23 If the ‘ground of referral’ is not accepted, the issue will be determined in the Sheriff Court, with 
its panoply of due process protections (Children (Scotland) Act 1995, s 68). 
24 Children (Scotland) Act 1995, s 70. 
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literally), dialogical process involving the lay panel members, the child, their family and 
the local authority social worker.  The hearing is required to give the child the 
opportunity to express their views and to ‘have regard to such views’ when making 
decisions.25  Studies suggest that the hearings system is relatively successful in 
encouraging participation in comparison to court systems.26  The importance of these 
participatory values of lay involvement, community representation and dialogical 
process is underlined by research which suggests that in criminal (and, by extension, 
juvenile) justice how and by whom decisions are made is as (if not even more) important 
to determining outcomes than what is actually decided.27  
 
Liberalism 
 
The children’s hearings system is a child of the 1960s, a time at which the so-
called labelling school of thought was forcefully advancing the view that criminal (or 
juvenile) justice interventions often do not reduce offending but rather backfire and 
                                                 
25 Children (Scotland) Act 1995, s 16(2). 
26 Eg, C Hallet and C Murray The Evaluation of Children’s Hearings in Scotland Vol 1 Deciding in 
Children’s Interests (Edinburgh: Scottish Office Central Research Unit, 1998); L Waterhouse et al 
The Evaluation of Children’s Hearings in Scotland Vol 3 Children in Focus (Edinburgh: Scottish 
Executive, 2000); S Asquith Children and Justice: Decision-Making in Children’s Hearings and 
Juvenile Courts (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1983). 
27 Eg, T Tyler Why People Obey the Law (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990); R 
Paternoster, R Brame, R Bachman and L W Sherman ‘Do Fair Procedures Matter? The effect of 
Procedural Justice on Spouse Assault’ (1997) 31 Law and Society Review 163. 
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make matters worse,28 and so measures which risked unnecessarily stigmatising young 
people should be avoided lest they exacerbate the behaviour they were intended to 
address.29  Consistent with this perspective, the Scottish hearings system, almost since 
its inception, has been instilled with a liberal dimension which is sometimes overlooked 
by critics focussing on the authoritarian potential of the hearings’ paternalistic 
welfarism.30  First and foremost, the system aims to address problems (including 
offending) through negotiation and the seeking of consensus.  This approach is 
enshrined in the overarching no non-beneficial order, or minimum intervention, 
principle, which provides that a requirement or order should only be made if ‘it would be 
better for the child that [it] be made than that none should be made at all.’31  Priority is 
thus given to seeking voluntary means by which troubled children (and their families) 
might be dealt with, though it is recognized (and power is provided) that compulsory 
measures may ultimately need to be imposed. Pivotal to this compulsion as a last resort 
mentality is the Reporter.32  The Reporter has wide discretionary powers to divert cases 
                                                 
28 Eg, H Becker Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance (London: Macmillan, 1963); E 
Lemert Human Deviance, Social Problems and Social Control (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-
Hall, 1967). 
29 Recent empirical evidence from the longitudinal Edinburgh Study of Youth Transitions of 
Crime shows that young people who were processed by the juvenile justice system were more 
likely to persist in their offending than those who offended at a similar level but who were not 
caught (D J Smith Social Inclusion and Early Desistance from Crime (Edinburgh, Centre for Law 
and Society, University of Edinburgh, 2006). 
30 Eg, A Morris and M McIsaac Juvenile Justice?: The Practice of Social Welfare (London: 
Heinemann Educational, 1978). 
31 Children (Scotland) Act 1995, s 16(3). 
32 The importance of the diversionary role of the Reporter is underlined by research evidence 
which suggests that the police tend to trigger formal intervention against young people on the 
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out of the system where it is determined that formal compulsory intervention is not 
required, and indeed does so in a substantial proportion of offence-based cases.33  The 
minimum intervention principle is also influential in those cases which the Reporter 
refers to a children’s hearing, as in a significant proportion the hearing will prefer 
voluntary measures to a supervision requirement.34  
 
Welfarism  
 
The effect of the introduction of the children’s hearings system was to more or 
less subsume juvenile criminal justice in Scotland within an integrated child care system.  
The Kilbrandon Committee were of the view that ‘the legal distinction between juvenile 
offenders and children in need of care or protection was – looking to the underlying 
realities – very often of little practical significance.’35  The system thus not only deals 
                                                                                                                                                 
basis of stereotypical class biased judgments concerning their ‘respectability’ as well as more 
objective evaluations of behaviour (L Mcara and S Mcvie ‘The usual suspects? Street-life, young 
people and the police’ (2005) 5 Criminal Justice 5).  
33 In 2005/6 a children’s hearing was arranged to consider the imposition of compulsory 
measures of supervision in respect of only 13 percent of children referred to the Reporter on 
offence grounds. For 16 percent of children referred, no hearing was arranged because 
compulsory measures were already in place but the other children’s cases were disposed of in 
some other, more informal, way (Scottish Children’s Reporter Administration Annual Report 
2005/2006 (Edinburgh: Scottish Children’s Reporter Administration, 2006), p 33). 
34 In 2005/6 a supervision requirement was imposed or an existing requirement reviewed in 75 
percent of cases referred to a hearing on offence grounds, the other cases were discharged (ibid, p 
35). 
35 Kilbrandon Committee, above n 19, para 13. Empirical research bares out the Committee’s 
assumptions as it has been found that the similarities in the backgrounds and circumstances 
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with children who have committed a criminal offence, but also care cases, which in 
England and Wales would now be dealt with by the family proceedings court under the 
auspices of the Children Act 1989.  One important consequence of this integration of the 
child care and juvenile justice systems is that, in theory at least, punishment is excluded 
from the range of powers available to children’s hearings; in all cases the ‘paramount 
consideration’ is ‘the welfare of the child throughout his childhood.’36  The system thus 
adopts a forward-looking approach, focussing on what needs to be done to address the 
underlying causes of the offending (or whatever the ground of referral to the hearings 
was), rather than a backward-looking approach which focuses on punishing the 
individual act.  This integrated, ostensibly non-punitive approach to juvenile justice, with 
its emphasis on the child’s ‘needs rather than their deeds,’37 has been described as a 
‘paradigm example’ of a welfare-based system of juvenile justice.38 
 
The ASBO regime: five areas of concern 
 
The readiness to resort to ASBOs 
                                                                                                                                                 
between children referred to the children’s hearings system on offence grounds and those referred 
for other reasons offend far outweigh the differences (L Waterhouse et al, n 26 above).  
36 Children (Scotland) Act 1995, s 16(1).  It should be noted that s 16(5) of the 1995 Act provides 
that a hearing may make a decision which is not consistent with the welfare of the child if it is 
deemed necessary to protect the public.  This represents the first substantive encroachment upon 
what had hitherto been the undisturbed predominance of the welfare criterion.  
37 Lockyer and Stone Juvenile Justice in Scotland: Twenty-Five Years of the Welfare Approach 
(Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1998), p 18. 
38 L McAra 'The Cultural and Institutional Dynamics of Transformation: Youth Justice in 
Scotland, England and Wales' (2004) 35 Cambrian Law Review 23. 
 11 
 
In contrast to the minimum intervention principle which shapes the Scottish 
children’s hearings system, it would seem that children in England and Wales frequently 
receive ASBOs even though other less formal, more constructive forms of intervention 
would have been possible.  At present a two-tier system of reprimands and warnings 
applies where a child commits a criminal offence in England or Wales.39  A child will 
generally receive a reprimand for a first offence, with a warning being issued if the 
offence is too serious for a reprimand or the child has previously received one.  The 
warning is designed to be a once-only penalty, with prosecution normally following for a 
further offence and second warnings only being given in exceptional circumstances.  An 
important feature of this framework is that the issue of a warning triggers the 
intervention of the local Youth Offending Team (YOT).  The role of the YOT is to assess 
the child’s needs and identify programmes which can be employed to address these 
needs with the intention of preventing further offending.  The framework is thus 
designed to divert children from the criminal justice process.  However, the ASBO is 
classified as a civil order and so falls outside the system of reprimands and warnings.  
Moreover, whilst there are certain statutory consultation requirements which must be 
satisfied before an ASBO can be applied for,40 consultation with the local YOT is 
prescribed by Home Office guidance only.41  In other words, it is possible to apply for, 
and obtain, an ASBO without first consulting the local YOT.  In fact, the study which the 
                                                 
39 CDA, ss 65-66. 
40 CDA, s 1E. 
41 A Guide to Anti-Social Behaviour Orders (London: Home Office, 2006), p 21.  See also the 
guidance jointly issued by the YJB, the Association of Chief Police Officers, the Home Office and 
the Together campaign (Anti-social Behaviour: A Guide to the role of Youth Offending Teams in 
dealing with anti-social behaviour (London: YJB, 2005) pp 23-27). 
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Youth Justice Board (YJB) completed for the Home Affairs committee inquiry found 
YOTs were not consulted in almost one-third of cases.42  This led the Home Affairs 
Committee to state: 
 
‘We were concerned to learn that Youth Offending Teams are not always 
consulted by those taking out an ASBO.  We believe that they should be consulted 
as a matter of course before an application for an ASBO is made: not as a veto, 
but to ensure that sufficient thought has been given to support needs and to 
ensure that other measures are also taken if appropriate’43 
 
The YJB’s more recent study nonetheless found that many YOTs – mainly those 
in high ASBO-use areas – remain dissatisfied at their involvement in the decision-
making process.  Even when they are consulted, this often comes so late in the decision-
making process that it is impossible to offer diversionary alternatives and, in any event, 
their contributions are given little weight.44  Rod Morgan, chairman of the YJB, drew two 
inferences from this widespread failure to adequately consult with YOTs.45  First, the 
possibility of adducing hearsay evidence at applications for ASBOs, coupled with the 
extremely wide definition of ‘anti-social behaviour,’ may mean that the ASBO is seen by 
                                                 
42 Memorandum submitted to the Home Affairs Committee inquiry Anti-Social Behaviour (5th 
Report of 2004-05) HC80 (London: The Stationery Office, 2005), vol III, Ev 219. 
43 Ibid, vol I, para 137. 
44 A Solanki, T Bateman, G Boswell & E Hill Anti-Social Behaviour Orders (London: Youth 
Justice Board, 2006), pp 52-53.  This study also found that YOTs are consulted even more 
infrequently prior to applications for post-conviction and interim ASBOs (pp 54-55). 
45 ‘Anti-social behaviour: getting to the root of the problem’ (2005) 23(1) Howard League 
Magazine 13. 
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some enforcement agencies as a way of fast-tracking problem children into custody.  
Second, that ASBOs, or the conditions attached to them, may be being imposed when 
they are not the most appropriate and constructive intervention.  These inferences are 
supported by the YJB’s recent study, which found that many YOT practitioners believe 
that ASBOs are used ‘prematurely, and that an approach that prioritised supportive 
intervention over enforcement would have a greater positive impact on the behaviour of 
individual young people.’46 
To try and combat this common failure to consider diversionary alternatives, 
many areas have developed a ‘tiered’ approach to dealing with anti-social behaviour by 
children, whereby a number of informal interventions must be attempted before thought 
is given to applying for an ASBO.  In Bridgend, for example, the first tier is a warning 
letter (3000 sent out), the second is a visit accompanied by a letter from either the police 
or the YOT’s ASBO support worker (400 visits made), the third is an Acceptable 
Behaviour Contract (30 agreed), and the final stage is to apply for an ASBO (two ASBOs 
imposed).47  In practice, however, the YJB found that in high ASBO-use areas tiered 
approaches are beset by a fundamental clash of ideologies.  While YOT practitioners see 
their role as being to assess and address a child’s needs in order to prevent further 
offending, the main priority of enforcement agencies in such areas is to provide relief to 
the community quickly and decisively.  For them, a tiered approach to tackling anti-
social behaviour is too slow and too uncertain.  It is thus unsurprising that the YJB found 
                                                 
46 Above n 44, p 130. 
47 Reg Denley, Programme Manager, Youth Works Scheme, Bridgend (oral evidence to the Home 
Affairs Committee inquiry, above n 42, vol III, Q 75).  For further information on Acceptable 
Behaviour Contracts, see Home Office A Guide to A Guide to Anti-Social Behaviour Orders and 
Acceptable Behaviour Contracts (London: Home Office, 2003). 
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significant differences between areas in the number of pre-ASBO tiers and in whether all 
tiers should be used or individual tiers could be bypassed.48 
There is a danger that the tendency, evident in England and Wales, to resort to 
ASBOs too readily could also pervade the ASBO regime in Scotland.  Worryingly, the 
minimum intervention principle does not apply to applications for ASBOs.  The role of 
the hearings system’s diverter in chief – the Reporter – is also relatively reduced.  It is 
the local authority or registered social landlord, not the Reporter, who determines 
whether to instigate the ASBO process; in stark contrast to the hearings process, there is 
no legal power for the Reporter to divert cases away from formal (ASBO) intervention; 
and it is the Sheriff Court, not the hearings system, which has been granted ultimate 
decision making power.49  These concerns are exacerbated by the fact that there are 
already signs of disquiet within Scottish New Labour, at both national and local level, 
about the relatively liberal approach which has so far prevailed.50  However, in contrast 
to England and Wales, where the system of reprimands and warnings is bypassed, the 
Scottish Parliament has made some effort to ensure that the hearings system is tapped 
                                                 
48 Above n 44, chs 5, 10 & 13. 
49 See further A Cleland and K Tisdall, ‘The Challenge of Antisocial Behaviour: New Relationships 
Between the State, Children and Parents’ (2005) 19 International Journal of Law, Policy and the 
Family 395, 405-406.  
50 For example, there are reports that the Scottish Executive’s Justice Minister has threatened to 
withhold funding from councils failing to make sufficient use of enforcement powers like the 
ASBO (‘Use ASBOs or no cash to fight crime, councils told’ The Scotsman 10 May 2005).  The 
influential Labour leader of Edinburgh City Council has also said that ‘ASBOs are supposed to be 
a last resort for under-16s, but what we really want is early ASBOS because that acts as a warning’ 
(‘Move to fast-track ASBOs for teenage yobs in the Capital’ Edinburgh Evening News 28 February 
2006). 
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into at various junctures.  Statute provides that when deciding whether to apply for an 
ASBO the local authority or registered social landlord must consult with the Reporter to 
the children’s hearings system,51 that when deciding whether to impose an interim ASBO 
the Sheriff must ‘have regard’ to any views expressed by the Reporter to the children’s 
hearing,52 and that, in the process for the imposition of a full ASBO, the Sheriff must 
instruct the Reporter to arrange a children’s hearing and ‘have regard’ to its advice as to 
whether the imposition of an order is necessary.53  Encouragingly, guidance produced by 
the Scottish Executive adds that the children’s hearings system ‘should continue to be 
the primary forum for dealing with antisocial or offending behaviour by under 16s,’ and 
that an ASBO ‘should only be pursued for a small number of persistently antisocial 
young people for whom alternative approaches have not been effective in protecting the 
community.’54  This would suggest that the ASBO should generally be considered a 
measure of last resort.  Indeed, whilst the guidance does also state that there ‘must be 
flexibility to allow for use of an ASBO before the full range of options has been exhausted 
where there is a pressing need to protect the community,’55 early research would suggest 
that in most parts of the country a last resort mentality has emerged, particularly in 
relation to under-16s.56  So, whilst it dilutes the principle of minimum intervention 
which applies in children’s hearings, the Scottish ASBO regime does illustrate that a 
                                                 
51 ASB (Scotland) Act, s4(11)(a), s 18. 
52 Ibid, s 7(3).  
53 Ibid, s 4(4). 
54 Scottish Executive Antisocial Behaviour etc. (Scotland) Act 2004: Guidance on Antisocial 
Behaviour Orders (Edinburgh: Scottish Executive, 2004), para 16. 
55 Ibid, para 54. 
56 DTZ Consulting and Heriot Watt University Use of Antisocial Behaviour Orders in Scotland: 
Report of the 2005/6 Survey (Edinburgh: Scottish Executive, 2006). 
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greater commitment to informal, diversionary schemes could be secured in England and 
Wales through integration of the ASBO with the normal youth justice process. 
 
The forum for ASBO applications 
 
The non-court setting of children’s hearings is one of the central planks of the 
Scottish system.  This stands in stark contrast to England and Wales, where children 
charged with a criminal offence appear before the youth court.  The youth court, a 
specialised branch of the magistrates’ court, tries and sentences young offenders aged 
from 10 to 17 inclusive.  A specialised system of criminal courts to deal with children was 
first introduced by the Children Act 1908.  Then named the juvenile court, its rationale 
was to employ special procedures geared at meeting children’s needs.  Whilst the 
Criminal Justice Act 1991 changed the juvenile court’s name to the youth court, it did not 
alter its underlying rationale: 
 
‘Although the powers of the youth court will in some respects be different from 
those of the juvenile court, the 1991 Act preserves the distinctive features of the 
juvenile court.  This is intended to ensure that young people are dealt with in a 
way which has proper regard for their youthfulness’57 
 
Proceedings in the youth court are more informal than in the adult magistrates’ 
court.  Magistrates sitting in the youth court are specially trained.  Clear, accessible 
language should be employed, and legal terminology avoided.  Rooms should be 
                                                 
57 Home Office ‘Criminal Justice Act 1991: Young People and the Youth Court’ Circular (London: 
Home Office, 1992).  One of the differences referred to is that the Act brought 17 year-olds within 
the Youth Court’s jurisdiction (Criminal Justice Act 1991, s 68). 
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appropriately furnished, without such formal and imposing features as raised benches.  
And sittings of the court are closed to the public. 
In certain situations, the youth court has the discretion to transfer a child to the 
adult Crown Court for trial.58  Following the European Court of Human Rights’ decision 
that Robert Thompson and Jon Venables’ trial for the murder of James Bulger had 
breached their right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR),59 Lord Bingham issued a practice direction describing how Crown Court 
trials involving children should be conducted.  This states: 
 
‘The trial process should not itself expose the young defendant to avoidable 
intimidation, humiliation or distress. All possible steps should be taken to assist 
the young defendant to understand and participate in the proceedings. The 
ordinary trial process should so far as necessary be adapted to meet those ends’60 
 
Some of the steps which might be taken to achieve this include allowing the child 
to visit the court pre-trial outside court hours so that he can familiarise himself with the 
courtroom, ensuring that all participants in the trial are on the same or almost the same 
level, allowing the child to sit with his family and in a place that permits easy, informal 
communication with his legal representatives, explaining the proceedings in language 
the child can understand, employing a timetable which takes account of a child’s inability 
to concentrate for long periods, not wearing robes and wigs, and restricting public 
attendance at the trial.  However, these steps were declared insufficient to satisfy the 
demands of Article 40(3) of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 
                                                 
58 Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000, ss 90-91. 
59 V & T v United Kingdom (2000) 30 EHRR 121. 
60 [2000] 2 All ER 285. 
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(UNCRC) by the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child.61  Fionda writes, 
‘these measures merely dress the window of the more significant problem … To 
effectively deny the child a child’s status and then to ask the court to be wary of the 
child’s youthfulness makes little sense.’62  Fortin points out that ‘despite the greater 
informality, children are still required to sit in a dock, stared at by the jury, and cross-
examined by barristers.’  Highlighting the stark contrast with the civil law’s perspective 
on a child’s capacity to instruct a legal adviser, she notes that ‘all those tried by the 
Crown Courts are considered to be capable of instructing their lawyers and 
comprehending the proceedings.’63 
The tendency to treat children accused of unlawful behaviour as being fully 
competent, and the concomitant failure to make adequate concessions for their 
youthfulness, has also pervaded the ASBO regime.  Since ASBOs are civil orders, 
applications for standalone orders fall outside the jurisdiction of the youth court and so 
are heard by the adult magistrates’ court.64  The Home Office guidance requires the 
applicant authority to ‘contact the justices’ clerk in advance of the hearing to ensure that 
it will be conducted in a way that is suitable for the child or young person,’ but the only 
modification which it stipulates in such cases is that ‘the justices constituting the court 
should normally be qualified to sit in the youth court unless to do so would result in a 
delayed hearing.’  In fact, the guidance insists that, unlike the youth court, the 
                                                 
61 Concluding observations: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
CRC/C/15/Add 188 (Geneva: Centre for Human Rights, 2002) paras 60-62. 
62 J Fionda Devils and Angels: Youth Policy and Crime (Oxford: Hart, 2005) p 139. 
63 J Fortin Children’s Rights and the Developing Law (London: Butterworths, 2nd edn, 2003) p 
565. 
64 Although the youth court does hear applications for post-conviction ASBOs (as does the Crown 
Court). 
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proceedings should be open to the general public with no automatic restrictions on press 
access or on revealing the child’s identity.65   
The failure to make adequate provision for young people is even more profound 
in the Scottish ASBO regime.  Whilst in England and Wales one court procedure has 
replaced another (albeit specially modified) court procedure, in Scotland the decision-
making hegemony of children’s hearings has been directly challenged by the Scottish 
Parliament’s choice of the Sheriff Court, sitting in its summary, civil mode, as the forum 
best placed to deal with applications for ASBOs against under-16s.66  This retrograde step 
is of great significance, for it marginalises key principles associated with the children’s 
hearings system, principally those of participation and welfarism.  Since the Sheriff 
Court is presided over by a single, senior, legally qualified and permanently appointed 
judge, selecting this institution as the forum for ASBO applications greatly diminishes 
lay involvement and community representation.  This is a surprising development, given 
that in recent years a discernible policy aim of government both sides of the border has 
been to attempt to address the problem of anti-social behaviour through the 
empowerment of local people in affected communities.  Anti-social behaviour policy, and 
the wider community safety agenda, is rooted in the intuition that attempts to govern 
security will be most effective when the knowledge and capacity of local people is 
mobilised to solve local problems.67  Participation is undermined still further by the 
choice of an adversarial procedure.  This is antithetical to the relatively informal, round 
table, dialogical process associated with children’s hearings.  The child in question may 
                                                 
65 Above n 41, p 16 & ch 9. 
66 ASB (Scotland) Act, s 4(10).  The move has attracted criticism – see A Cleland & K Tisdall, 
above n 49. 
67 Les Johnston and Clifford Shearing Governing Security: Explorations in Policing and Justice 
(London: Routledge, 2003). 
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possibly not even be present at the hearing of the application for an interim ASBO.68  
Selecting the Sheriff Court as the decision-making forum for ASBOs also compromises 
the principle of welfarism.  It represents a clear symbolic statement that a child’s anti-
social behaviour is not primarily a matter for an integrated child care and juvenile justice 
system concerned with the child’s needs.  Beyond the symbolic, the sole criteria for the 
Sheriff to impose an ASBO are that the child has acted anti-socially and that an order is 
necessary to protect others from further anti-social acts.  Why the child’s welfare should 
be the paramount consideration when a children’s hearing determines whether to 
impose a potentially highly invasive supervision requirement on a child following the 
commission of an offence (including a breach of an ASBO), but that welfare should 
effectively be excluded from consideration when determining whether an ASBO should 
be imposed, is far from clear. 
So, on both sides of the border, the choice of forum for applications for ASBOs 
against young people displays a failure to make adequate concessions for their 
youthfulness.  To a limited extent, it would be straightforward to remedy this in England 
and Wales.  The ASBO could be reclassified as criminal in nature so that applications for 
orders fall within the jurisdiction of the youth court.  Whilst the ASBO was purposely 
classified as civil in nature in order to avoid the application of certain criminal law due 
process protections, principally the rule against hearsay evidence,69 since the remedy was 
not intended for use against children avoiding the youth court’s jurisdiction was not part 
of the order’s design.  But, while such a change would be welcome, it would only go some 
                                                 
68 ‘There is no explicit provision for any representations made by or on behalf of the respondent 
before an interim ASBO is granted, although the court, using its discretion, can consider any such 
representations as it sees fit’ (Scottish Executive, above n 54, para 86).  
69 A Ashworth ‘Social Control and “Anti-Social Behaviour”: The Subversion of Human Rights?’ 
(2004) 120 LQR 263. 
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way towards meeting the needs of children accused of anti-social behaviour.  The 
children’s hearings system is an example of what a decision-making forum shaped by the 
values of participation and welfarism should look like.  Key to it are its location outside 
the normal court structure and its non-judicial processes.  Whilst the youth court is less 
formal than the adult magistrates’ court, it is still far removed from children’s hearings. 
 
The terms of ASBOs 
 
Anecdotal examples of outlandish ASBOs are becoming increasingly common – 
the ASBO banning a woman who had attempted suicide on four occasions from jumping 
into rivers or canals or onto railway lines, and the ASBO banning a pensioner from 
feeding pigeons in his back garden being just two examples.70  Equally fantastic orders 
have been imposed on children.  A 13 year-old was banned from using the word ‘grass’ 
for six years, and a 15 year-old boyfriend and girlfriend were banned from speaking to 
each other for four years.71  Proponents of the ASBO argue that examples like these are 
exceptional.  This may or may not be true; the burgeoning case law on the topic certainly 
suggests that there is a prevalence of poorly drafted ASBOs.72  But concerns about the 
                                                 
70 ‘Woman banned from jumping in the river’ The Daily Telegraph 26 February 2005; ‘Bird lover 
gets Asbo for feeding pigeons’ The Times 31 July 2006. 
71 ‘When home’s a prison’ The Guardian Weekend 24 July 2004; ‘Sweethearts banned from seeing 
each other’ Plymouth Evening Herald 3 February 2005. 
72 Amongst the prohibitions which the appeal courts have held to be invalid are: ‘In any public 
place, wearing, or having with you anything which covers, or could be used to cover, the face or 
part of the face. This will include hooded clothing, balaclavas, masks or anything else which could 
be used to hide identity, except that a motorcycle helmet may be worn only when lawfully riding a 
motorcycle’ (R v Boness [2005] EWCA Crim 2395, [2006] 1 Cr App R (S) 120); ‘Not to be a 
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prohibitions imposed by ASBOs extend beyond these sorts of anecdotal examples.  These 
concerns relate, first, to so-called preventive prohibitions and, second, to the negative 
nature of the prohibitions which ASBOs impose. 
In England and Wales, Home Office guidance insists that the formulation of 
prohibitions must be given careful thought.73  However, the YJB’s study of ASBOs 
imposed on children between January 2004 and January 2005 found that often the 
prohibitions imposed are not targeted or realistic, but formulaic.74  The study expressed 
particular concern about ASBOs which impose geographical exclusions or prohibitions 
on associating with particular people.  This concern was given added weight by the 
study’s finding that each type of prohibition features in roughly half of all ASBOs.75  
Indeed, they are expressly encouraged by the Home Office guidance,76 and have also 
been endorsed by the Court of Appeal.  In R v Boness Hooper LJ explained: 
 
‘The aim of an ASBO is to prevent anti-social behaviour. To prevent it the police 
or other authorities need to be able to take action before the anti-social behaviour 
it is designed to prevent takes place’77 
                                                                                                                                                 
passenger in or on any vehicle, whilst any other persons is [sic] committing a criminal offence in 
England or Wales’ (W v Acton Youth Court [2005] EWHC 954 (Admin), (2006) 170 JP 31); and 
‘Not to be in possession of any bladed article’ (R v Starling [2005] EWCA Crim 2277).  Some 
general guidance on drafting the terms of ASBOs is set out in the judgment of Hooper LJ in R v 
Boness, and in chapter 7 of the Home Office guidance (above n 41). 
73 Above n 41, p 29. 
74 A Solanki et al, above n 44, p 141. 
75 Ibid, p 75. 
76 Above n 41, ch 7. 
77 Above n 72, [36]. 
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So, if a group of young people assemble on a housing estate to race motor bikes, 
the ASBO should not merely prohibit them from racing motor bikes.  It should also 
prohibit them from being in each other’s company on the estate.  This would allow the 
authorities to intervene as soon as they begin to assemble, and so not have to wait for 
them to begin racing. 
Preventive prohibitions, which include curfews as well as geographical exclusions 
and bans on associating with particular people, are difficult to square with the 
institutional values – particularly the principle of welfarism – which are central to the 
children’s hearings system.  They may nonetheless be imposed on both sides of the 
border, because, just as in England and Wales, the Scottish legislation states that an 
ASBO is not limited to preventing repetition of the anti-social behaviour – the order may 
impose any prohibitions deemed necessary for the purpose of protecting others from 
further anti-social behaviour by the person subject to the order.78  The statutory 
requirement to give paramount consideration to the child’s welfare, which shapes 
decision-making in a welfarist direction in the children’s hearings system, does not 
apply.  This focus on public protection provides fertile ground for the kind of preventive 
prohibitions which have been actively encouraged in England and Wales.79   
One consequence of this focus on public protection at the expense of the principle 
of welfare is that preventive prohibitions may prove counter-productive.  Sometimes this 
counter-productivity is obvious.  For example, an 18 year-old in Manchester was given 
                                                 
78 ASB (Scotland) Act, s 4(6); CDA, s 1(6).  
79 It should be noted that, since a children’s hearing can make a decision which is not consistent 
with the welfare of the child if it is necessary to protect the public from serious harm (above, n 
36), an ASBO could conceivably be imposed through an application of this exception to the 
general rule that the child’s welfare is paramount.  
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an ASBO which prohibited him from congregating with three or more other youths.  He 
was subsequently arrested when he entered a successful local youth club with a good 
reputation on the grounds that there were more than three youths in the premises, even 
though the session scheduled for that evening was how to deal with anti-social 
behaviour.80  But they can also be counter-productive in a more general manner.  Access 
to public space and spending time with friends is of great importance to young people.81 
Emphasising this, the YJB study states that preventive prohibitions reduce the likelihood 
of co-operation and compliance.  The majority of breach cases centre on failure to 
comply with these types of prohibitions.  A more targeted approach, with more sparing 
use of preventive prohibitions, would help reduce the incidence of breach of ASBOs.82 
Preventive prohibitions may also breach children’s rights under Articles 8, 10 and 
11 of the ECHR.  Whilst the infringement of these rights may have the legitimate aim(s) 
of preventing crime and disorder and/or protecting the rights and freedoms of others, it 
                                                 
80 NAPO ‘Anti-Social Behaviour Orders – Analysis of the First Six Years’ Memorandum submitted 
to the Home Affairs Committee inquiry, above n 42, vol III, Ev 185.  In a similar vein, ASBOs have 
been imposed which included a curfew that stopped a young person from getting employment 
opportunities because he couldn’t get to work early enough, and which prohibited a young person 
from entering any motor vehicle, thereby preventing him from accepting lifts from staff of the 
local Youth Offending Team to Positive Activities schemes and from getting on a probation 
minibus to take him to do his community service (Memorandum submitted by the YJB to the 
Home Affairs Committee inquiry, above n 42, vol II, Ev 143).  Fully involving the local YOT in the 
process of applying for an ASBO would help prevent counter-productive prohibitions of the sort 
described. 
81 See H Matthews, M Limb & M Taylor ‘The “Street as Thirdspace”’ and T Skelton ‘Nothing to do, 
Nowhere to go?’ in S Holloway & G Valentine (eds) Children’s Geographies: Playing, Living, 
Learning (London: Routledge, 2000). 
82 Above n 44, pp 142, 148. 
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is arguable that they are disproportionate.  Although the Strasbourg Court has not 
explicitly recognised the ‘least restrictive means’ test as an aspect of proportionality, it 
‘has often in practice decided the question of proportionality by asking whether a 
particular measure could be achieved by a less restrictive means.’83  Yet preventive 
prohibitions not only ban repetition of the anti-social behaviour (the motor bike racing), 
they also ban conduct which is necessarily prior to it (assembling on the housing estate).  
To the extent that such orders extend beyond prohibiting a child’s anti-social behaviour, 
it is arguable that they violate the ECHR.   
In England and Wales there is a further reason for believing that ASBOs which 
impose preventive prohibitions on children (and also ASBOs which only contain non-
preventive prohibitions) may be held to be disproportionate.  Unlike Scotland, where 
there is no statutory minimum duration for an ASBO,84 in England and Wales all ASBOs 
must last for at least two years85 – which is a long time in the life of an adolescent.  The 
Home Affairs Committee opined that this minimum duration is ‘inappropriate’ in the 
case of children, and that magistrates should be given greater discretion to set the 
duration of an order.86  Maurice Kay LJ’s acceptance that ‘Just because the ASBO must 
run for a minimum of two years it does not follow that each and every prohibition within 
a particular order must endure for the life of the order’87 has mitigated the rigidity of the 
                                                 
83 R Clayton & H Tomlinson The Law of Human Rights (Oxford: OUP, 2000) para 6.47.  For 
examples, see Campbell v United Kingdom (1992) 15 EHRR 137 para 48 and Ahmed v United 
Kingdom [1999] IRLR 188 para 63. 
84 ASB (Scotland) Act, s 4(5). 
85 CDA, s 1(7). 
86 Above n 42, vol I, para 222. 
87 R (on the application of Lonergan) v Lewes Crown Court [2005] EWHC 457 (Admin), [2005] 
2 All ER 362, [13]. 
 26 
two year minimum duration to some extent.  The Home Office guidance also states that 
ASBOs against children should be reviewed annually by the bodies that applied for the 
order in the first place.  If these bodies decide that any of the prohibitions are no longer 
necessary, they should apply to vary or discharge the order.88  However, the YJB study 
not only found that a significant number of children are being served with ASBOs well in 
excess of two years, but also that, in practice, there is no evidence that orders are 
proactively reassessed once they have been made.89 
The second set of concerns regarding the terms of ASBOs relates to the fact that 
they must be negative in nature – an ASBO cannot place positive requirements on an 
individual.  An order will thus do little to address the underlying causes of the behaviour.  
This is especially significant given that the Home Affairs Committee found that young 
perpetrators of anti-social behaviour often suffer from serious disadvantages and social 
exclusion and have significant support needs.90  The Committee concluded that the ‘most 
important’ reason why almost half of all ASBOs are breached is the ‘insufficient support 
given to perpetrators who may have problems of addiction or of mental health or may be 
living in chaotic families.’91   
Burney has observed that a purely negative measure like the ASBO would be 
‘unthinkable’ in the welfarist Swedish system.92  Seeking to adapt the order for the 
similarly welfarist Scottish system, the Scottish Parliament and Executive have 
attempted some integration with the hearings system.  So, for example, the Sheriff must 
                                                 
88 Above n 41, p 45. 
89 Above n 44, pp 73, 141. 
90 Above n 42, vol I, para 87.  The findings of the YJB were similar (above n 44, ch 4).  
91 Ibid, vol I, para 224. 
92 E Burney Making People Behave: Anti-Social Behaviour, Politics and Policy (Cullompton: 
Willan Publishing, 2005) p 157. 
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obtain the advice of the Reporter when determining whether to impose an interim ASBO, 
and the advice of a children’s hearing when determining whether to impose a full 
ASBO.93  And if an ASBO or interim ASBO is imposed the Sheriff is granted the 
discretionary power to order that a children’s hearing be arranged to determine the 
nature and extent of any compulsory measures of supervision that may be necessary to 
run alongside the ASBO.94  In a similar vein, the Criminal Justice Act 2003 introduced 
the Individual Support Order (ISO) in England and Wales.95  An ISO – designed to 
‘address the underlying causes of the behaviour that led to the ASBO being made’96 – 
imposes positive requirements on an individual, such as meeting with a specified person 
or participating in specified activities (like counselling for substance misuse or an anger 
management programme).  If the arrangements for implementing ISOs are available in 
the area in which the child resides, a magistrates’ court making an ASBO must either 
                                                 
93 ASB (Scotland) Act, ss 7(3) and 4(4) respectively.  
94 Ibid, s 12. 
95 In addition to the ISO provisions, CDA, ss 8-9, provide that any court imposing an ASBO on a 
child aged under 16 must also issue a Parenting Order or explain why a Parenting Order would 
not be desirable in the interests of preventing repetition of the anti-social behaviour.  For 16 and 
17 year-olds the court may make a Parenting Order if it considers that an order would help 
prevent repetition of the behaviour.  On the subject of Parenting Orders, see L Koffman ‘The Use 
of Anti-Social Behaviour Orders: An Empirical Study of a New Deal for Communities Area’ 
[2006] Crim LR 593 and J Lyon, C Dennison & A Wilson ‘Tell them so they Listen’: Messages 
from Young People in Custody Home Office Research Study 201 (London: Home Office, 2000). 
96 Anti-social Behaviour: A Guide to the role of Youth Offending Teams in dealing with anti-
social behaviour, above n 41, p 27. 
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issue an ISO or explain its reasons for not doing so.97  An ISO can require an individual 
to attend sessions for up to two days per week, for a period of up to six months.  Breach 
of an ISO without reasonable excuse is a criminal offence, punishable (in the case of 
those aged 14 and over) by a fine of up to £1000.98 
The creation of the ISO represents a welcome concession that the imposition of 
negative prohibitions cannot, in itself, tackle the underlying causes of an individual’s 
anti-social behaviour.  However, while in Scotland any supervision requirement is 
imposed by a children’s hearing shaped by the values of participation and welfarism, an 
ISO is imposed by a court.  Moreover, for ISOs to have a chance of working effectively 
requires that sufficient resources are made available and that these resources are 
targeted properly.99  The YJB found that over one-third of sentencers were unaware of 
the ISO or their power to impose it.  Moreover, the children that ASBOs are sought 
against had often had previous contact with the local Youth Offending Team (YOT), 
which led a majority of sentencers to opine that the ISO will only prove to be a useful 
measure in a small proportion of cases.  Some also added that ISOs are ‘too little too 
late,’ and are no substitute for a lack of earlier support to families.100  And there is a 
further difficulty.  In R (McCann & others) v Crown Court at Manchester101 the House of 
Lords applied the three criteria set out by the European Court of Human Rights for 
                                                 
97 Note that a court making a post-conviction ASBO cannot issue an ISO, the rationale being that 
the sentence imposed for the criminal offence should tackle the underlying causes of the anti-
social behaviour. 
98 The statutory framework governing ISOs is found in CDA, ss 1AA & 1AB. 
99 See the report of the Home Affairs Committee, above n 42. 
100 Above n 44, pp 70, 143. 
101 [2002] UKHL 39, [2003] 1 AC 787. 
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determining whether applications for ASBOs are civil or criminal proceedings.102  One of 
the reasons the Lords gave for their conclusion that proceedings for the imposition of an 
ASBO are civil in nature was that ASBOs only impose negative prohibitions, and so are 
intended to be preventative, not punitive.  Lord Hope stated: 
 
‘The essential characteristics of an anti-social behaviour order are that the 
defendant is prohibited from doing something … An anti-social behaviour order 
may well restrict the freedom of the defendant to do what he wants and to go 
where he pleases.  But these restrictions are imposed for preventive reasons, not 
as punishment’103 
 
The Home Office has recognised that, since attaching an ISO to an ASBO 
increases the burden on the individual, it makes it more difficult to regard the 
combination of orders as being purely preventive.104  The creation of the ISO post-
                                                 
102 The three criteria are: the classification in domestic law; the nature of the offence; and the 
nature and degree of severity of the penalty (Engel v The Netherlands (No 1) (1976) 1 EHRR 647). 
103 At [75]-[76]. 
104 The Home Office gave this as a reason for rejecting arguments that it should be possible to 
impose an ISO for a longer period than six months (Supplementary memorandum submitted by 
the Home Office to the Home Affairs Committee inquiry, above n 42, vol III, Ev 171). 
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McCann thus raises the question whether, in relation to children,105 the civil 
classification of ASBOs is still appropriate.106   
 
Publicising the details of ASBOs 
 
In criminal proceedings in the youth court in England and Wales, there is a 
presumption that a child’s personal details should not be divulged.107  This protection of 
a child’s anonymity accords with a child’s rights under the UNCRC and Beijing Rules.108  
But since the ASBO is classified as a civil order, the presumption in favour of anonymity 
is reversed, so that there is instead a presumption in favour of disclosure.109  The 
                                                 
105 Following the creation of the Intervention Order (CDA, ss 1G-1H), similar logic could also now 
apply to ASBOs against adults. 
106 For an argument that the hybrid nature of the ASBO means that the Lords in McCann should 
have classified it as criminal in nature, see S Macdonald ‘The Nature of the Anti-Social Behaviour 
Order – R (McCann & others) v Crown Court at Manchester’ (2003) 66 MLR 630. 
107 Children and Young Persons Act 1933, s 49.  This presumption is reversed where a child is 
tried in the Crown Court (R v Central Criminal Court, ex p W [2001] 1 Cr App R 2). 
108 UNCRC, Art 40(2)(b)(vii); United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of 
Juvenile Justice (the ‘Beijing Rules’), r 8. 
109 Children and Young Persons Act 1933, s 39.  Where a child is convicted of a criminal offence in 
the youth court and a post-conviction ASBO is imposed, the presumption of anonymity is 
reversed in those parts of the proceedings concerned with the making of the order (CDA, s 
1C(9C)).  The presumption in favour of anonymity is also reversed where a child is prosecuted for 
breach of an ASBO (CDA, s 1(10D)), the rationale being to ‘allow local communities to be involved 
in the justice system by ensuring that breaches of antisocial behaviour orders can be publicised, 
so that people can see who is doing what and where it is being done’ (David Blunkett HC Deb vol 
428 col 1059 7 December 2004). 
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argument that there should be a presumption in favour of anonymity at applications for 
ASBOs, even though the proceedings are civil ones, was rejected by the High Court in R 
(on the application of T) v St Albans Crown Court.110  Far from reinforcing the child’s 
interest in anonymity, Elias J explained that ‘where an anti-social behaviour order has 
been imposed, that is a factor which reinforces, and in some cases may strongly 
reinforce, the general public interest in the public disclosure of court proceedings.’111  
Home Office guidance reiterates this, stating that a court must have a ‘good reason’ to 
prevent identification of the young person and that ‘Age alone is insufficient to justify 
reporting restrictions being imposed.’112   
Whether a similar approach will prevail in Scotland is uncertain.  There is a strict 
ban in the children’s hearings system on any publicity which may identify a child subject 
to the hearings process.113  Public identification would not only be antithetical to the 
system’s liberal-welfare values, but would also jeopardise the perceived legitimacy of 
consensual decisions regarding the child’s future conduct reached in accordance with 
participatory values.  Moreover, section 44(1) of the Children (Scotland) Act 1995 – 
                                                 
110 [2002] EWHC 1129 (Admin).  In a similar vein, the High Court in R (on the application of K) v 
Knowsley Metropolitan Borough Council [2004] EWHC 1933 (Admin), [2005] HLR 3 rejected 
the argument that there should be a presumption in favour of anonymity at proceedings for the 
imposition of an interim ASBO.  Harrison J explained ‘that the interim nature of the proceedings, 
which do not involve any findings on the allegations, is a very important consideration to put into 
the balance so that it can be balanced against the undoubtedly important consideration … relating 
to publicity assisting in the effectiveness of enforcing the interim order’ ([44]). 
111 Ibid, [22]. 
112 Working Together – Guidance on Publicising Anti-Social Behaviour Orders (London: Home 
Office, 2005) p 4. 
113 Children (Scotland) Act 1995, s 44(1). 
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which prohibits the publication of information intended to, or likely to, identify a child or 
the child’s school/address in any case about which the Principal Reporter has received 
information – will apply to all applications for ASBOs because, as noted above, the 
Principal Reporter will receive information about each and every ASBO case concerning 
a child under the age of 16 at various stages of both the interim and full ASBO process.  
The effect of the section, breach of which is a criminal offence, is thus to create a strong 
presumption against publicity.  And although the Sheriff retains a power to allow 
publication ‘in the interests of justice,’114 deciding whether to exercise this discretion 
constitutes the determination of a matter with respect to a child, and so the Act’s 
overarching requirement to regard the welfare of the child as paramount applies.115  
Since it is difficult to conceive of circumstances in which publicity could be consistent 
with the paramountcy principle, publicity should only be permitted in the rare situation 
where the Act permits the principle to be disregarded – where it is necessary to protect 
the public from ‘serious harm.’116  This is very unlikely to be the case where a child has 
committed minor criminal or non-criminal anti-social behaviour. 
‘Naming and shaming’ strategies nonetheless have political appeal.  The Scottish 
Executive’s First Minister, Jack McConnell, returned from a fact-finding trip to 
England’s ‘ASBO capital’, Manchester, apparently impressed by the Council’s 
uncompromising approach, including ‘name and shame’ tactics.  It has also been 
reported that a policy of ‘naming and shaming’ of under-16s could be included in 
Labour’s manifesto for the forthcoming elections to the Scottish Parliament.117  Plus, in 
spite of the provisions of the Children (Scotland) Act 1995 outlined above, guidance 
                                                 
114 Ibid, s 44(5). 
115 Ibid, s 16(1). 
116 Ibid, s 16(5). 
117 B Ferguson ‘We’ll shame young thugs’ Edinburgh Evening News 17 January 2006. 
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published by the Scottish Executive states that since the ASBO is ‘a public court 
document … the fact that it has been made and its terms and duration are in no way 
confidential’.118  The guidance goes on to say that it is for the Sheriff imposing the order 
to determine whether publicity should be permitted, taking into account the need to 
justify the interference with the individual’s rights under Article 8(1) ECHR.  The 
guidance describes the individual’s age as merely an ‘important factor’ to consider when 
balancing the rights of the individual with the public interest.  So publicity campaigns 
similar to those in England and Wales may yet also be mounted in Scotland. 
The Home Office guidance issued in England and Wales gives five reasons for its 
insistence that ‘publicity should be expected in most cases.’119  Of these five, three – 
public reassurance about safety, public confidence in local services, and deterring other 
perpetrators – could equally be used to justify divulging the personal details of children 
charged with a criminal offence, yet in criminal proceedings a presumption of anonymity 
applies.  This raises the question whether the other two reasons – enabling local people 
to police the order, and (therefore) deterring the child from breaching the order – are in 
themselves sufficient to justify reversing the presumption into one in favour of 
disclosure. 
Whether it is necessary to disclose a child’s personal details to enable victims of 
the anti-social behaviour to police an ASBO is doubtful – victims will often know, or at 
least be able to recognise, the child in question.  But it is not just victims who are 
expected to police the order.  The whole community, victims and non-victims, are 
expected to play their part, a stark example of a ‘responsibilization strategy’.120  
                                                 
118 Above n 54, para 120. 
119 Above n 112, p 2. 
120 D Garland ‘The Limits of the Sovereign State: Strategies of Crime Control in Contemporary 
Society’ (1996) 36 Brit J Criminol 445. 
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Orchestrating publicity campaigns to disseminate the information non-victims need to 
police an ASBO risks fostering anger and resentment in the local community.  Such an 
approach, which encourages a lynch mob mentality and exacerbates social exclusion, 
resonates with Rutherford’s description of the ‘eliminative ideal.’121  The naming process 
does nothing constructive to aid a child’s reintegration into the community.  It is 
disintegrative.122  Unsurprisingly, the YJB found widespread concern amongst 
professionals about publicising the details of children with ASBOs, and that, in some 
cases, public identification acted as a badge of honour and created a sense of satisfaction 
about causing trouble.123  To publicly name children, who are engaged in a process of 
self-development and so are susceptible to stigmatization, ignores the lessons of the 
labelling theorists of the 1960s. 
But, even if one were to accept that, notwithstanding the concerns just outlined, 
the benefit of enabling the local community to police ASBOs outweighs a child’s interest 
in anonymity, a further concern remains – the nature of the rhetoric that tends to 
accompany such publicity.  Demonising headlines like ‘Ban on Devil Kid, 10,’ ‘The Imps 
of Satan,’ ‘Reclaim our Streets: Yob War’ and ‘Hellraiser cannot use front door’ are all too 
familiar.124  In R (on the application of Stanley) v Metropolitan Police Commissioner,125 
the three teenage claimants sought a declaration that material carrying their 
                                                 
121 A Rutherford ‘Criminal Justice and the Eliminative Ideal’ (1997) 31 Social Policy and 
Administration 116. 
122 J Braithwaite Crime, Shame and Reintegration (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1989). 
123 Above n 44, ch 9. 
124 The Sun 22 April 2004, Daily Mail 4 May 2004, Daily Mirror 31 August 2004 & Liverpool 
Daily Post 20 January 2005 respectively. 
125 [2004] EWHC 2229 (Admin), [2005] HLR 8. 
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photographs, names, ages and the details of the ASBOs issued against them breached 
their Article 8 ECHR right to respect for their private and family life.  The material 
included statements on the Council’s website describing the gang members as ‘thugs’ and 
as ‘bully boys’ who engaged in ‘animalistic behaviour,’ and a leaflet which included a 
statement, under the heading ‘Lets Complete the Job,’ that the gang members could be 
imprisoned if caught breaching their ASBOs.  Rejecting the claimant’s argument that 
their Article 8 rights had been violated, the High Court held that the language used in the 
publicity was not disproportionate.  Kennedy LJ stated: 
 
‘The language used in some of the publicity was colourful, but having regard to 
the known facts already in the public arena it was entirely appropriate, and the 
colour was needed in order to attract the attention of the readership’126 
 
Condoning the use of colourful language extends beyond permitting 
dissemination to the local community of the information they need to police an order.  
Colourful language is likely to be emotive, sensationalist and stigmatising.  As argued 
above, it is likely to hamper a child’s development, heighten social exclusion and harbour 
resentment in the local community.  Resorting to such rhetoric in order to stir local 
people into policing ASBOs should not be an acceptable tactic.   
  
Custodial net-widening 
 
In England and Wales persistent offenders aged 15-17 and persistent, dangerous 
offenders aged 12-14 who breach an ASBO may receive a custodial sentence – the 
                                                 
126 Ibid, [40]. 
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maximum being a Detention and Training Order of up to 24 months’ duration.127  In 
Scotland, by contrast, the Scottish Parliament has expressly provided that custodial 
sentences cannot be imposed on under-16s who breach an ASBO.128  The significance of 
this is more symbolic than practical; as per the vast majority of criminal cases in 
Scotland, breaches of ASBOs involving under-16s will almost invariably be dealt with by 
the children’s hearings system rather than prosecuted by the Procurator Fiscal in the 
criminal courts.   
Between 1992 and 1997 the number of 10-17 year-olds sentenced to custody in 
England and Wales rose by about 40%.  After levelling off, the number then fell by 17% 
between the first quarter of 2001 and the third quarter of 2003.129  This was welcomed by 
Rod Morgan, who stated that, whilst there is no alternative to keeping some young 
offenders in custody, ‘the number of these young offenders is considerably smaller than 
the present custodial population.’130  A few months later, at the start of 2005, Morgan 
wrote: 
 
‘In early 2004, following a 15 month trend of reducing numbers, the Youth 
Justice Board witnessed an alarming surge in the number of juveniles in custody: 
a 10% increase, compared with the usual seasonal rise of around 5%.  Given the 
backdrop of falling crime, the question was: Why?  Suspicions arose as to 
                                                 
127 Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000, s 100.  For all other under-18s breach is 
punishable with a community penalty.  Note also that a conditional discharge is not an available 
disposition for breach of an ASBO (CDA, s 1(11)). 
128 ASB (Scotland) Act, s 10, amending the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995.  
129 Audit Commission Youth Justice 2004: A Review of the Reformed Youth Justice System 
(London: The Stationery Office, 2004) p 35. 
130 YJB Annual Review 2003/04 - Building in Confidence (London: YJB, 2004) p 4. 
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whether the increasing popularity of Anti-Social Behaviour Orders (ASBOs) … 
might partly be responsible’131 
 
These suspicions were understandable.  The Home Office have insisted that the 
courts should not ‘treat the breach of an order as just another minor offence.’132  And the 
courts have held that, where an act constitutes a standalone criminal offence as well as 
breach of an ASBO, the sentence which may be imposed for the ASBO breach is neither 
calculated with reference to the sentence that would normally be imposed for the 
standalone offence nor limited by the standalone offence’s maximum sentence.133  
Moreover, there was anecdotal evidence which suggested that the ASBO was causing an 
increase in the number of children in custody.134  The YJB accordingly carried out a study 
to examine the profile of those children entering custody as a result of breaching an 
                                                 
131 Above n 45. 
132 Above n 41, p 48.  Earlier versions of the guidance contained similar statements.  Significantly, 
the Youth Court Bench Book (London: Judicial Studies Board, 2006) states that ‘Breach of an 
order is a serious criminal offence and should be tackled quickly and effectively,’ and then 
qualifies this: ‘It is not always necessary to impose a custodial sentence for breach of an ASBO, 
especially where the original behaviour for which the ASBO may have been imposed was not 
sufficiently serious to carry a custodial sentence’ (p 1-52, emphasis added). 
133 R v H, Stevens & Lovegrove [2006] EWCA Crim 255.  For discussion of this aspect of the 
ASBO, see S Macdonald ‘The Principle of Composite Sentencing: Its Centrality to, and 
Implications for, the ASBO’ [2006] Crim LR 791.   
134 See T Donovan ‘Antisocial orders come under fire’ Young People Now 28 April 2004 and the 
memorandum submitted by the YJB to the Home Affairs Committee inquiry, above n 42, vol II, 
Ev 143. 
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ASBO.135  It found that 95% of the children in the study were already known to the local 
YOT, that the average number of previous offences committed by those children for 
whom previous offence history was available was 42, and that the children had been 
subject to various interventions prior to a custodial sentence.  Morgan thus concluded 
that the ASBO did not appear to be drawing into custody children who, prior to the 
introduction of the order, would not have ended up there.136   
Nonetheless, given the readiness to resort to the ASBO in England and Wales, it 
remains possible that the ASBO could widen the custodial net for young people.  The lack 
of integration with the normal juvenile justice process means that the ASBO regime 
south of border contains few safeguards against net-widening.  This stands in contrast to 
Scotland.  Whilst the children’s hearings system, as an integrated child welfare system, is 
ostensibly non-punitive, highly interventionist measures are possible.  The supervision 
requirements which may be imposed can include a requirement to be looked after for a 
time in local authority accommodation, and – in some circumstances – placing the child 
in secure accommodation (thus depriving them of their liberty)137 or imposing a 
movement restriction condition involving electronic tagging.138  But in Scotland there are 
                                                 
135 The findings are contained in the supplementary memorandum submitted to the Home Affairs 
Committee inquiry, above n 42, vol III, Ev 217.  The YJB warned that the sample size for the study 
was relatively small and that the study had methodological limitations.  Its more recent study 
stated that it was impossible to ascertain, from the available data, ‘whether the ASBO, and any 
subsequent breaches, exacerbated the risk of custody over and above what would have been 
expected from further offending in any event’ (above n 44, pp 113-114). 
136 Oral evidence to the Home Affairs Committee inquiry, above n 42, vol III, Q 450. 
137 Children (Scotland) Act 1995, s 70. 
138 ASB (Scotland) Act, s 135, amending Children (Scotland) Act 1995, s 70. 
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a number of ‘protective shields’139 which provide a bulwark against escalatory tendencies.  
First and foremost, by rooting the breach process firmly in the mainstream children’s 
hearings system rather than the criminal justice system, the institutional values of 
participation, liberalism and welfarism should help prevent any significant increase in 
the use of secure accommodation.140  The role of the overarching minimum intervention 
and welfare principles in section 16 of the Children (Scotland) Act 1995 and their 
application by Reporters and children’s hearing panellists against the background of an 
increasingly punitive political and media climate will be crucial in this regard.  Second, 
there is the practical reality that the number of places in secure accommodation in 
Scotland is, at present, relatively small (fewer than one hundred), and although there are 
moves to slightly increase the capacity of this secure estate, the restricted numbers 
prevents the children’s hearings system and local authority social work chiefs from 
resorting to incapacitation as a convenient strategy for dealing with troublesome youth.  
 
Conclusion 
 
                                                 
139 A Rutherford ‘Youth Justice and Social Inclusion’ (2002) 2 Youth Justice 100. 
140 A children’s hearing can only authorise the placing of a child in secure accommodation if: 
either the child having previously absconded, is likely to abscond unless kept in secure 
accommodation and if he absconds, it is likely that his physical, mental or moral welfare will be at 
risk; or the child is likely to injure him or herself or some other person unless kept in such 
accommodation (Children (Scotland) Act 1995, s 70). Moreover, the s 16 ‘minimum intervention’ 
and ‘welfare’ principles are applicable to secure accommodation decisions.  
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Over the past century, youth justice policy in England and Wales has fluctuated 
between broadly punitive and welfarist approaches.141  There have also often been 
bifurcations of policy, with a punitive approach being adopted for some, normally 
serious or persistent, young offenders, and a welfarist approach prevailing for others 
who are perceived as merely a nuisance.142  Since the murder of James Bulger, political 
and public attitudes towards young offenders have hardened, and a punitive approach 
has dominated.143   
At the heart of the punitive approach is a conception of young offenders as 
‘devils.’  Fionda explains: 
 
‘The youth justice process increasingly denies young offenders their childhood, 
since as devils, they are assigned adult-like attributes of evil and the competence 
of free will … If the devilish nature of offending young people can be banished – 
by coercion if necessary – then the assumption is that they can reclaim their 
“childhood” and rejoin the “angels”’144 
 
                                                 
141 See, eg, A Rutherford Growing out of Crime: The New Era (Winchester; Waterside, 1992).  
Note that there are emerging signs of divergent approaches to childrens’ rights in England and 
Wales – see J Williams ‘Incorporating Children’s Rights: The Divergence in Law and Policy’ 
(2007) 27 LS (forthcoming) 
142 See, eg, A E Bottoms, K Haines & D O’Mahony ‘Youth Justice in England and Wales’ in J 
Mehlbye & L Walgrave (eds) Confronting Youth in Europe (Copenhagen: AKF, 1998). 
143 J Fionda ‘Youth and Justice’ in J Fionda (ed) Legal Concepts of Childhood (Oxford: Hart, 
2001). 
144 J Fionda, above n 62, p 6. 
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The ASBO is a prime example of this perspective.  Although it was designed solely 
for use against adults, the Government have encouraged its use against young people.  
The ASBO regime in England and Wales thus has little regard for the youthfulness of 
children who engage in perceivedly anti-social behaviour,145 and attaches little weight to 
the principles of participation, liberalism and welfarism.   
Empirical evidence illustrates the importance of the principle of welfarism.  A 
simplistic ‘devils’ and ‘angels’ dichotomy is impossible to sustain.  Offenders and victims 
are very often the same people, with offending predicting victimisation and vice versa.146  
Children who offend could just as easily have come to official attention as children in 
need of care and protection.147  A non-bifurcated, welfare-based approach, which focuses 
in a child-centred, holistic, positive and inclusionary way on addressing the child’s 
various troubles, is most appropriate.  In spite of this, the statutory criteria for the 
imposition of an ASBO on a young person do not include his/her welfare.  Home Office 
guidance states:  
 
‘There should be no confusion as to the purpose of the order, which is to protect 
the community.  Where the case concerns a child, the welfare of the child is, of 
course, to be considered, and indeed the making of the order should contribute to 
this by setting standards of expected behaviour.  But the welfare of the child is 
not the principal purpose of the order hearing’148 
                                                 
145 For discussion of the so-called youth problem, and the factors which have contributed to its 
emergence, see E Burney, above n 92, pp 64-76. 
146 D J Smith The Links Between Victimization and Offending (Edinburgh: Centre for Law and 
Society, University of Edinburgh, 2004). 
147 See, eg,  L Waterhouse et al, above n 26.  
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This failure to recognise the importance of the principle of welfarism is further 
illustrated by the frequent imposition of preventive prohibitions, by the two-year 
minimum duration of an ASBO, and by the promotion of publicity campaigns which 
commonly employ ‘colourful’ language.  Arguments that measures like these are needed 
to control crime rates are rebutted by victimisation data from Scotland, which suggests 
that it is possible to have less crime without a punitive juvenile justice system,149 and 
from a comparative study of different systems in two cities (one in Germany, the other in 
the USA) showing that a highly punitive interventionist criminal justice system does no 
better at deterring juvenile crime than a relatively lenient approach.150 
Empirical evidence also underlines the importance of the principle of liberalism.  
Self-report studies suggest that offending and anti-social behaviour is so prevalent in the 
teenage years that it can be viewed as a relatively normal feature of adolescence,151 and 
that all but a small minority will be ‘adolescent limited offenders’152 and will ‘grow out of’ 
crime and anti-social behaviour.153  The ASBO nonetheless sits abreast of the 
diversionary scheme of reprimands and warnings, allowing YOTs to be marginalised and 
the order to be resorted to too readily.  This is especially dangerous given the potential 
                                                 
149 D J Smith ‘Less Crime Without More Punishment’ (1993) 3 Edinburgh Law Review 294. 
150 D Huizinga, K Schumann, B Ehret, A Elliott The Effect of Juvenile Justice System Processing 
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151 See, eg, D Wilson, A Sharp and D Patterson Young People and Crime: Findings from the 2005 
Offending, Crime and Justice Survey (London: Home Office, 2006). 
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for formal intervention to backfire and increase rather than reduce the risk of recidivism.  
The ASBO closely fits Sherman’s description of the conditions which are likely to 
cultivate proud and shameless defiance, resulting in a net increase in the prevalence, 
incidence or seriousness of the behaviour a measure was intended to address.154 
The disregard for participatory values is evidenced by the fact that applications 
for ASBOs are heard in the adult magistrates’ court, with little being done to help young 
people understand or participate in the proceedings.  This is especially unfortunate given 
that New Labour recognised the importance of these values by adopting the Youth 
Offender Panel (YOP) system for first time offenders pleading guilty in the youth court.155  
It could even be argued that YOPs subscribe more fully to participatory values than the 
                                                 
154 The four conditions identified by Sherman are: (1) the sanction is unfair.  A young person 
subject to an ASBO may regard it as either substantively unfair (eg, the terms seem to him to be 
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community the agent represents (often the effect of an ASBO is to exacerbate social exclusion); 
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act (ASBOs are often accompanied by publicity campaigns); and (4) the individual denies or 
refuses to acknowledge the stigmatizing shame that has been imposed (evidence that some young 
people regard ASBOs as a badge of honour).  See further L Sherman ‘Defiance, Deterrence and 
Irrelevance: A Theory of the Criminal Sanction’ (1993) 30 Journal of Research in Crime and 
Delinquency 445. 
155 The Government has recently shown interest in injecting participatory values into the ASBO 
process in England and Wales by giving ‘communities’, in the form of Tennant Management 
Organisations, the power to apply for ASBOs (Draft SI The Local Authorities (Contracting Out of 
Anti-Social Behaviour Order Functions (England) Order 2007 (London: HMSO, 2007). The 
significance of YOPs is that they show how participation can be harnessed in a more inclusionary 
manner. 
 44 
children’s hearings system because they can include the victim(s) of the offending as well 
as community representatives.156 
Assuming that the ASBO will continue to form part of the Government’s 
campaign against anti-social behaviour, we believe that greater weight could be given to 
the principles of participation, liberalism and welfarism by making three fundamental 
changes to the ASBO regime in England and Wales insofar as it applies to young people.  
First, the order should be reclassified as criminal in nature.157  Indeed, the creation of the 
ISO may dictate this.  Second, a new independent specialised agency analogous to the 
Reporter should be established to oversee the prosecutorial functions in relation to 
youthful criminal anti-social behaviour.  Third, orders should only be imposed by special 
‘youth panels,’ the composition of which would resemble existing institutional 
architecture in the form of YOPs,158 though our proposed panels would be primarily 
welfarist rather than restorative in nature. 
If ASBOs were classified as criminal in nature, the scheme of reprimands and 
warnings would apply, and so a young person would only be eligible for an ASBO if he 
had previously received a warning.  If a young person who has received a warning is 
                                                 
156 The evaluation of the YOPs found that as regards opportunities to participate, understanding 
of the process and perceived fairness of the proceedings, young people and their families rated the 
YOP process highly in comparison to their experience of the Youth Court (T Newburn, A 
Crawford, R Earle, S Goldie, C Hale, A Hallam, G Masters, A Netton, R Saunders, K Sharpe and S 
Uglow The Introduction of Referral Orders into the Youth Justice System: Final Report Home 
Office Research Study 242 (London: Home Office, 2002)). 
157 For the argument that ASBOs should be classified as criminal in nature regardless of whether 
they are imposed on adults or children, see S Macdonald, above n 106 & n 133. 
158 A YOP is composed of one member of the local youth offending team and two lay community 
representatives. 
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charged with committing a criminal act of anti-social behaviour, his case would be 
referred to the new prosecutorial official who would be granted a wide discretion to 
determine whether formal measures might be required.  The principles of minimum 
intervention and welfare would apply to his decision making.  If it was determined that 
formal measures might be necessary the child would be referred to a youth panel if he 
either admits guilt or (if he denies guilt) if the youth court finds liability established.159  
Commission of the crime would thus act as a ground of referral, as in the children’s 
hearings system.160  In accordance with participatory values, the youth panel would 
adopt an informal, dialogical process aiming to reach consensus.  As in the existing YOP 
system, victims would continue to be invited to attend.  A range of measures, including 
those which may currently be included in an ISO, would be available.  The panel’s 
paramount consideration would be the young person’s welfare.  Whilst imposition of an 
ASBO would be available, the principle of minimum intervention would apply and so an 
order would not normally be imposed.  If an ASBO was imposed – either through mutual 
agreement or because the young person is deemed to pose a serious risk – the welfare 
principle would also apply to the terms of the order, which would militate against the use 
of preventive prohibitions.  The ASBO’s criminal classification, coupled with the 
                                                 
159 This would differ from the existing arrangements for YOPs, whereby a child is only referred to 
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160 As Cleland and Tisdall point out, making commission of acts of anti social behaviour a new 
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principle of welfarism, would dictate a strong presumption in favour of anonymity.  In 
the event that an ASBO is imposed and subsequently breached, the prosecutorial official 
would determine whether a custodial sanction might be necessary and if so, refer the 
case for prosecution in the youth court where Detention and Training Orders would 
remain an available sanction.161  However, the principles of minimum intervention and 
welfarism would apply which would mean that custody should only be resorted to if truly 
necessary. 
In spite of the introduction of the ASBO against 12-15 year-olds in Scotland, the 
primary forum for dealing with young offenders remains the children’s hearings system.  
This system regards young offenders as simply one subgroup of the broader category of 
children in need, and so adopts an approach based on the principles of participation, 
liberalism and welfarism.  South of the border, the ASBO has quickly become one of the 
most popular measures in the campaign to tackle anti-social behaviour by young people, 
notwithstanding the fact that the remedy was designed for use solely against adults and 
that a large number of the children who receive orders suffer from serious disadvantages 
and social exclusion and have significant support needs.  This article has shown how, by 
reclassifying the ASBO and introducing new youth panels, greater weight could be given 
to the values at the heart of children’s hearings.  This would ensure a more effective 
response to the needs of young people who behave anti-socially. 
                                                 
161 The youth court could be granted discretionary power to revert the case to the youth panel for 
(non custodial) disposal in appropriate cases. The power to refer a case to a children’s hearing for 
disposal is often used by the courts in Scotland in the small number of under-16s cases that are 
prosecuted rather than referred to the children’s hearings. 
